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Abstract 
Understanding the challenges of sustainable fisheries management is not easy for non-
specialists, and even many specialists fail to appreciate the potential evolutionary 
consequences of harvest. We propose candy-fish experiments as a savoury approach 
to teaching and disseminating the key principles of applied ecology and evolution to 
students, practitioners, and the general public. We performed a simple experiment 
where the resource was represented by fish-shaped candy of distinct colours and 
flavours (strawberry and liquorice). Typically, harvesting was neither ecologically 
sustainable (55% of the populations were extinct by the end of the experiment) nor 
evolutionarily sustainable (most surviving populations had liquorice fish only). This 
harvest-induced evolution went apparently unnoticed. Somewhat encouragingly, the 
harvest was most likely ecologically sustainable when a person spontaneously took 
the role of a stock manager. 
Keywords: candy-fish, dissemination, education, ecological sustainability, harvest-
induced evolution 
Introduction 
Managing wild fisheries is challenging, and the track record of fisheries management 
worldwide leaves plenty of room for improvement (Dankel et al., 2008; FAO, 2012; 
Worm et al., 2009). Superficially, the problem is easy to solve: it is generally 
accepted that reducing exploitation rate and by-catch, as well as maintaining relatively 
large fish stocks and low impact on ecosystems are key issues for a sustainable fishery 
(Hilborn, 2007b). However, there is no consensus on how to achieve these objectives. 
A major challenge is that managing fish stocks is really about managing people 
(Larkin, 1988), fishermen in particular, but increasingly a much wider group of 
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stakeholders too (Hilborn, 2007a; Larkin, 1988; McMullin and Pert, 2010). The 
situation is further complicated because the concept of success differs between 
ecologists, economists, policy makers, etc. (Hilborn, 2007a) and because fishery 
systems are characterized by uncertainty and ambiguity (FAO, 1995; Francis and 
Shotton, 1997; Moxnes, 1998).  
Fish resources are typically common property resources. If nobody controls 
exploitation, altruistic behaviours are not rewarded and people tend to behave 
selfishly and overexploit the resource as the costs of selfish actions are shared by all 
exploiters. This is commonly known as “the tragedy of the commons”, after Hardin’s 
(1968) seminal paper. Avoiding the tragedy requires closing the commons by 
restricting individual access and exploitation (Basurto and Ostrom, 2009; Hardin, 
1968). However, the top-down practice of managing (fishermen are told when, where 
and how to fish) is destined to fail (Kraak, 2011) as it results in uncooperative 
behaviours and unexpected and creative ways to circumvent the rules (Hilborn, 
2007a). Therefore, studying the behaviour of the exploiting agents, as well as their 
motivation and incentives, is the key to a successful fishery, complementing the study 
of ecological outcomes (Hilborn, 2007a). 
 An additional challenge to sustainability is that fishing may drive unwanted 
evolution in fish populations. Fishing is purposely selective, commonly directed 
towards larger individuals. Fishing can also be directly selective for behavioural 
patterns, activity, sex, morphology, and maturity (Heino and Godø, 2002; Nelson and 
Soulé, 1987; Smith, 1994). If a part of the phenotypic variation in selected 
characteristics is genetic, fishing drives genetic change (Law, 2000). There is 
increasing evidence that fisheries-induced evolution is contributing to the phenotypic 
changes commonly documented in fish stocks (Jørgensen et al., 2007; Kuparinen and 
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Merilä, 2007; Law, 2000). This could have negative effects on the utility humans 
derive from fish stocks (Jørgensen et al., 2007), not least on the fisheries yield 
(Conover and Munch, 2002; Edley and Law, 1988).  
Given these challenges for developing appropriate management systems, we 
believe there is a need in better communicating the interplay of human behaviour and 
ecological and evolutionary feedbacks to the general public, and to students and 
practitioners in fisheries science and applied ecology. Traditional, lecture-based 
learning methods have been criticized for leading to low motivation, while active 
learning keeps the students involved and is more effective (Mitchell et al., 2013). 
Thus, games, as a form of active learning, have been developed for teaching purposes 
in a wide range of disciplines from health education, science, and technology to social 
change (Sherry 2013). Learning through own experience is powerful (Kolb, 1984; 
McCarthy and McCarthy, 2006), especially when relatively abstract phenomena like 
the tragedy of the commons and fisheries-induced evolution can be made tangible. 
Therefore, we designed a simple, easily-repeated experiment to illustrate the key 
principles of applied ecology and evolution. We used a bowl of candy-fish as a 
resource as we needed a model system where assessing the cause-effect relationships 
of exploitation would be both straightforward and rewarding. Specifically, we used 
the candy-fish system to test two main hypotheses: 1) exploitation is selective and 
leads to changes in populations’ genetic composition (clonal composition, in our 
particular case), and 2), formal training in fisheries biology and management 
improves ecological, but not evolutionary sustainability.  
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The experimental set-up 
Eleven groups of people (at the University of Bergen, Institute of Marine Research, 
and Fisheries Directorate in Bergen, Norway) were each provided with one ‘fish 
stock’, a bowl with fish-shaped candy, from which anyone could harvest. The groups 
were defined by coffee tables at three different working places. Each bowl contained 
two types of candy-fish, initially at the same frequency (total N = 50). The two types 
were similar in size and appearance, except for their colour and flavour: liquorice fish 
were black and strawberry fish were red. The bowl was accompanied with a note 
informing that the candy-fish will be available if harvested sustainably and the fish 
would reproduce daily (Figure 1). 
We considered our candy-fish as clonally reproducing populations with two 
genotypes, corresponding to the black and red phenotypes. Population dynamics 
followed a Beverton-Holt model, where black fish gave birth to black fish, and red 
ones to red (see the Supplementary Materials for details). However, the two candy 
types shared a common source of density-dependent population regulation. We set 
carrying capacity and a maximum population growth ratio ( K   = 50 and λ  = 3, 
respectively) such that populations were small enough for the participants to readily 
see the consequences of their actions. The maximum sustainable yield was around 
thirteen candy-fishes per day, i.e., similar to average number of participants in each 
group (approximately 12); this gave on average one fish for each participant every 
day.  
The abundance of fish was assessed daily, and the appropriate number of fish 
was added according to the model. Beyond this daily census, we did not 
systematically monitor the coffee tables. However, coffee tables were in the daily 
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working environment of the persons taking care of the populations, and we could 
often make informal observations; the participants were unaware of the role of the 
experimenter in the study. The experiment lasted eight candy-fish generations in each 
population. 
The eleven exploiting groups were categorized according to: 
 1) Their formal knowledge in fisheries science. We hypothesized that training 
in fisheries science would facilitate sustainable harvesting. Five groups had training in 
fisheries biology, and the remaining six groups did not. We hypothesized that training 
in fisheries science would facilitate sustainable harvesting. The theory of fishing 
(Clark, 1990) suggests that when harvesting a virgin stock, the optimal solution is to 
immediately reduce it to the level that produces the maximum sustainable yield 
(MSY). Here, the exploiters could not know which level produced MSY as the model 
underlying population renewal was unknown to them. However, from basic lectures 
in fisheries biology one learns that in the Schaefer model, MSY is obtained when the 
population is kept at half of its carrying capacity, and that this is a conservative rule of 
thumb for many other situations too (Shepherd, 1982; Worm et al., 2009). In contrast, 
even though awareness about evolutionary consequences of fishing is increasing, this 
has yet to influence practical fisheries management, and we did not expect that the 
exploiters would notice that evolution was taking place in the experimental 
populations. After all, fisheries management is primarily focused on maintaining 
sufficiently large stocks (e.g., sufficient spawning stock biomass), and only 
secondarily on composition.  
2) The treatment they experienced (anonymity or writing names). The 
experiment was repeated twice for each group. One time the participants were asked 
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to write their names down if they were participating; the other time there was no such 
request but only a note explaining the common “rules of the game” (Figure 1). We 
hypothesized that this treatment would result in a reduced harvest rate because 
humans are known to be less selfish when given even subtle cues of being watched 
(Bateson et al., 2006; Haley and Fessler, 2005; Kraak, 2011). In the first round of the 
experiment there were six randomly selected groups with the “writing names” 
treatment and five groups with the “anonymity” treatment; the treatments were 
swapped in the second round of the experiment. In addition, this set-up allowed us to 
assess the effect of experience, as we could compare the outcome of the first round 
(candy experiment-naïve participants) with the second round (experienced 
participants). However, we had no means to ensure that all participants wrote down 
their name, and it is likely that many did not.  
3) The presence of a “manager” in the group. In some groups a person 
emerged during the experiment and took responsibility for the stock. This manager 
controlled the harvest, by regulating the harvest of the other group members, aiming 
at ensuring sustainability; their role ranged from merely informing that the candy had 
a purpose and was not for free to implementing a moratorium. This happened 
spontaneously and independently from the original study design, and we do not have 
precise knowledge about when a manager started nor how managers were respected. 
There were four groups controlled by a manager, and seven groups unmanaged.  
There were managers in groups both with and without fisheries knowledge 
(respectively 3 and 1 groups).. 
We did not explicitly explain to the participants that they were part of an 
experiment, but the note in the bowl implied that the candy were not just a gift. The 
note hinted that there was a purpose on the candy bowl as it described the simple 
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“rules of the game” (Figure 1). The lack of detailed information was on purpose in 
order to mimic an unregulated fishery. 
Results 
The abundance of candy-fish decreased over time (Figure 2a), and on the last day of 
the experiment, 55% of the populations and 63% of the clones were extinct. The 
average daily extinction rate was 11%. Only 4% of the daily harvest rates of our 
replicate populations were in accordance with the harvest rate that would have 
provided the maximum sustainable yield. The harvest rate did not differ between the 
anonymity treatments (writing names or anonymity; odds ratio = 0.93, z = -0.83, df = 
1, p = 0.41), or between the groups with and without formal fisheries knowledge 
(odds ratio = 0.48, z = -1.22, df = 1, p = 0.22). Among the potential explanatory 
variables, the factor that had the strongest effect on the harvest rate was the presence 
of a controlling person who would look after the stock. The groups with spontaneous 
“stock manager” had a significantly lower harvest rate compared to groups without 
such manager (odds ratio = 0.28, z = -2.11, df = 1, p = 0.04; Figure 3). The average 
harvest rate declined between the first and the second round of the experiment (odds 
ratio = 0.80, z = -2.31, df = 1, p = 0.02; Figure 4), suggesting that the participants 
learned from their past experience, but this effect was weaker than the effect of a 
“manager”.  
Harvesting over MSY (thirteen candies per day) on the first day was 
associated with a higher overall harvest rate (odds ratio = 2.54, z = 9.17, df = 1, p < 
0.001). It seems that groups that harvested strongly on the first day maintained that 
strategy over the course of the experiment and depleted the stock faster (Figure 1).  
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The strawberry fish declined in abundance more dramatically compared to the 
liquorice fish (Figure 2b). Exploitation of the stock was selective on colour or/and 
flavour: the harvest probability of the two types of candy differed, being higher for 
the strawberry type (odds ratio = 1.59, z = 5.77, df = 1, p < 0.001; Figure 3). 
Consequently, the relative frequency of liquorice fish increased over time, and fewer 
liquorice than strawberry fish clones were extirpated (Figure 2b). 
Discussion 
The candy experiment was aimed to illustrate human behaviour when exploiting a 
shared resource. Even our simple system illustrated that common pool resources are a 
complex system to manage, as uncertainty and the effect of the commons problem are 
coupled. While the predicted evolutionary effects indeed took place, they were 
overshadowed by a more dramatic consequence of harvesting: extinction was the 
most typical outcome in our experimental populations. The exploiters also showed 
unforeseen behaviours. In one case, the harvest was so intense than even the bowl 
itself hosting the candy-fish disappeared. In the other extreme, we witnessed an 
introduction of an “alien” species: one bowl was supplemented with a new type of 
candy, after the candy-fish population went extinct.  
In addition to assessing the value of the experiment as an educational tool, we 
were able to obtain interesting insights to conditions that could lead to lower harvest 
rates. Sadly, formal knowledge on fisheries biology did not have a significant effect 
on harvesting. It seems that fisheries scientists did not put their knowledge into 
practice when confronted with a problem outside their professional realm. This result 
is in accordance with a more complex experiment (Moxnes, 1998) where the 
participants (researchers, fishermen and bureaucrats) could exploit a resource with 
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exclusive property rights; 74% of the participants harvested over MSY, independently 
of the category they belonged to. Moxnes (1998) concluded that the participants, 
regardless of their background, relied on current measures of benefits, instead of long-
term ones. 
On a more positive side, good governance seemed to help: emergence of a 
person (independently from the original experimental set-up) who started to manage 
the stock resulted in lower harvest rates compared to populations that remained open-
access. This person talked to other group members about the possibility of extinction 
and the “rules of the game” and—in one occasion—even established a moratorium. 
This result agrees with the conclusion of Ostrom et al. (1992) that the tragedy of the 
commons is not inevitable with common pool resources because self-governance can 
emerge. Ostrom et al. (1992) performed an experiment where participants could 
invest on a common pool resource under different conditions for communication and 
sanctioning. In Ostrom et al.’s (1992) experiment, as in our experiment, harvesting 
was most prudent when there was some kind of communication between the 
participants, and a controlling method was established within the group (see Kraak, 
2011, for a thorough discussion on this topic in the fisheries context). Indeed, a few 
fisheries have recently implemented self-governance approaches, and despite 
appearing in very different contexts (e.g., orange roughy in New Zealand, scallops in 
France, and pollock in Alaska, just to name a few), these approaches have often been 
successful (Townsend and Shotton, 2008). Moreover, exploiters learned from their 
past failures: harvest rates declined from first to the second round of the experiment. 
It seemed that the experience of a depleted stock acted as a kind of sanction that 
improved future outcomes. Notice, however, that contrary to expectations (e.g., 
Kraak, 2011), reduced anonymity did not improve the outcome. It is likely that 
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writing down ones name or nickname did not reduce anonymity enough to have a 
detectable effect.  
Exploitation is not just a demographic phenomenon. Our candy-fish 
experiment showed, as we hypothesized, that exploitation is selective and has 
evolutionary consequences, albeit in one of the simplest possible experimental 
settings. In general, harvesting is a selective process that can act on different traits. In 
this case there was selection over candy flavour that resulted in shifts in the clonal 
composition of the experimental populations. Exploitation-induced evolution can 
have important implications for the exploiting agents. In our experiment, the liquorice 
candy type became to dominate the populations. As we knew a priori that most people 
prefer the strawberry flavour, this outcome was negative from the majority 
perspective. This evolutionary change seems to have gone largely unnoticed: change 
in population composition was not mentioned in the discussions that we witnessed, 
and surviving populations became dominated by one flavour. Avoiding evolution 
would have required maintaining equal harvest pressure on both candy types, or in the 
case of skewed distribution, active harvest of the more frequent type, thus maintaining 
the composition of the populations similar to the pristine conditions. Even though 
single participants might have realized that evolution was taking place, there is no 
evidence to suggest that this influenced behaviour of the groups.  
Our simple experiment is far from being the first one to experimentally study 
harvest-induced evolution (e.g., Conover and Munch, 2002; Edley and Law, 1988; 
Philipp et al., 2009; van Wijk et al., 2013). Among these, Edley and Law’s (1988) 
experiment on water fleas, Daphnia magna, was similar to ours in that it showed 
evolution in a clonal system: populations where large individuals were removed 
became dominated by slow-growing clones. Admittedly, our experiment is even 
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further removed from real-life fisheries than Edley and Law’s (1988) experiment—
which already was largely ignored by fisheries scientists, perhaps because it was 
based not on fish but on a tiny crustacean. However, in one respect our experiment 
was more realistic than other experiments on harvest-induced evolution so far: 
selection was not artificially imposed, but it naturally emerged from preferences of 
individual exploiters. 
Our study has several limitations. The relatively low potential yield of the 
candy-fish populations per exploiter (only about one fish per day) perhaps made 
sustainable exploitation particularly hard. No doubt a sufficiently productive 
population would have resulted in satiation and ecologically sustainable exploitation, 
but we wanted to have populations that were small enough such that the consequences 
of exploitation were clear and directly visible (flooding coffee tables with candy is not 
ethical either). However, we do not expect that our evolutionary results would have 
been qualitatively affected. It is also not clear whether many groups failed to attain 
sustainability because they did not take the experiment seriously enough to even 
bother to try, or because they tried but did not succeed. However, informal 
interactions with some participants suggested that at least some of them took the study 
seriously and tried their best to achieve a sustainable candy-fishery.  
We propose candy-fish experiments as a powerful tool for teaching and 
disseminating basic principles of applied ecology and evolution in schools, science 
fairs and universities (flavours can be adjusted to local taste). Experiential learning 
techniques, such as games, have been shown in many disciplines (e.g., biology, 
psychology, marketing, mathematics, etc.) to increase student learning (Mitchell et 
al., 2013). We have already used different candy-fish experiments in teaching, 
allowing students to experience the selective nature of exploitation, harvesting for 
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MSY, and how this can be altered by population demographics (see the 
Supplementary Materials for an example). A classroom setting facilitates learning by 
allowing a tighter interaction with the participants, both before, during, and after the 
experiment, something we did not attempt during the experiment described here. 
However, the advantage of the uncontrolled setting of our experiment is that it 
allowed for a greater spontaneity in how the resources were exploited, perhaps 
revealing more instinctive behaviours than what carefully briefed participants might 
have done (cf. Moxnes, 1998; Ostrom et al., 1992). Either way, a candy-fish 
experiment is fun and rewarding for the participants, illustrates the fundamental 
challenges in sustainable population management in a tangible way, and is open to 
countless variations. 
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Figure 1. Labels that were placed next to the experimental candy-fish populations. 
Label a) was used for the treatment with full anonymity. Label b) was used for the 
treatment where participants were encouraged to register. 
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Figure 2. Trends in candy-fish abundance for (a) populations and (b) clones. In (a), 
the thick continuous line shows mean abundance over all populations, and the dotted 
and dashed lines show the mean abundance for “managed” and “unmanaged” 
populations, respectively. In (b), the black and red lines show the mean abundance for 
liquorice and strawberry clones, respectively: over time, the mean proportion of 
liquorice clone in populations increase (dashed line). The gray lines show abundance 
trajectories of individual (a) populations or (b) clones. The diameters of the pie charts 
along the margins indicate the total number of cases characterized by a particular 
endpoint, with grey and white sectors depicting respectively unmanaged and managed 
populations in (a); black and red sectors representing respectively liquorice and 
strawberry clones in (b).  
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Figure 3a. Average harvest probability for strawberry and liquorice candy-fish 
without (N = 252) and with a stock manager controlling exploitation (N = 144). Mean 
+ SE bars, total N = 396. Figure 3b. Average harvest probability for strawberry and 
liquorice candy fish during the first (N=198) and second round (N=198) of the 
experiment. Mean + SE bars, total N= 396. 
